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Loose Talk Kills: What’s Worrying about Unity of Method 
 
Nancy Cartwright 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is danger in stressing commonalities among methods because the differences 
matter in fixing the meaning of our claims. Different methods can, and often do, 
test the same claim. But it takes a strong network of theory and empirical results to 
ensure that. Failing that, we are likely to fall into inference by pun. We use one set 
of methods to establish a claim, then draw inferences licensed by a similar-sounding 
claim that calls for different methods of test. Our inferences fail and bridges we 
build (or policies we set) depending on them fall down. 
 
 
 
1. What's Here. 
 
Perhaps we can find a sufficiently general and abstract description that homogenizes our many 
disparate scientific methods. But there is danger in the enterprise. Failing a good, well-established, 
thick theory of the concepts we employ, the methods we use to test claims involving these concepts 
play a central role in fixing exactly what those claims are. And we must be clear about exactly 
what claims we are making if we are to know what inferences we can draw from them. We must 
be wary of ‘inference by pun’: drawing inferences that follow legitimately from a claim employing 
the same words but which is not the claim we have established, whose meaning is fixed in part by 
the test procedures we have used to establish it. I elaborate this worry in Section 2. Section 3 
illustrates using causality as an example. But the lessons apply equally to a great many central 
scientific concepts.  
 
 
2. What Claim are we Making? 
 
Two decades of emphasis on scientific practice in Science Studies underline that a vast number of 
practices make up science, including classifying, experimenting, measuring, settling on standards, 
designing and building machines (cf. machine physics) and technology (like the laser or Kelvin’s 
Atlantic cable), constructing models and blueprints for real-life situations, creating new substances 
and materials and new ways to change the world (that contemporary genetics witnesses repeatedly), 
developing new mathematics, discovering, creating, and stabilizing phenomena, calculating, 
inferring, making, refining and defending concrete claims about specific situations and specific 
systems, providing a vast number of low level ceteris paribus laws, etc. It is this thick web of 
procedures and applications that give content to our scientific claims. Without them the claims are 
mere words, as Thomas Kuhn argued:  
 
Consider ... the quite large and diverse community constituted by all physical 
scientists. Each member of that group today is taught the laws of, say, quantum 
mechanics, and most of them employ these laws at some point in their research or 
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teaching. But they do not all learn the same applications of these laws, and they are 
not therefore all affected in the same ways by changes in quantum mechanical 
practice. On the road to professional specialization, a few physical scientists 
encounter only the basic principles of quantum mechanics. Others study in detail 
the paradigm applications of these principles to chemistry, still others to the physics 
of the solid state, and so on. What quantum mechanics means to each of them 
depends on what courses he has had, what texts he has read, and which journals he 
studies. … [T]hough quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or 
electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not the same 
paradigm for all. (Kuhn 1962, 49-50) 
 
These ideas are developed by Peter Galison, who argues that different scientific groups imbed 
what can seem the same concepts in very different networks of practice and inference that thus 
embody different understandings. Groups with different ‘thick’ understandings communicate to 
some extent via stripped down ‘pidgin’ languages---but the understandings and practices imbedded 
in these pidgins are far from sufficient to do the tasks of any of the separate groups (Galison 1997). 
Kuhn’s points generated decades of discussion about the rationality of theory change, 
supposing that he had shown that new theory and old do not refer to the same thing with the same 
words and hence do not contradict each other. My concern is rather with the use to which we put 
scientific knowledge. The topic in this symposium is unity of method. Maybe there are somethings 
all scientific methods have in common and there may be some good purposes served by 
adumbrating these. But when it comes to use, it is crucial to stress the disunity and particularity of 
the methods and practices that interpret and support scientific claims. There has long been the rosy 
hope that we can establish results that sail free of the methods, practices, techniques, successful 
predictions and applications, and rich web of concrete low theory that interpret and support them: 
We can take scientific results and put them on a shelf in a knowledge supermarket for consumers 
to take away to use in new homes. This is dangerous. If the uses we make of scientific claims are 
to be successful, we must ensure that the methods and practices used to establish a scientific claim 
are sufficient to support the inferences we draw from it. To do the contrary is to fall into science 
by pun.  
The claims of science must be supported---in detail---by empirical facts. This support is 
witnessed by success in predicting and intervening precisely in the world. If so, what is supported 
are claims as interpreted through the network of concrete assumptions and practices that afford 
the successful predictions and interventions. Although I shall illustrate my worries about unity of 
method by drawing out the lessons of causal pluralism, there is nothing special about causality; 
what is true of it is widely true. It is important to keep different methods differentiated because 
they so often are methods appropriate to finding out about different things, even if these things 
share a common name; and what follows from knowledge about one of these things will not follow 
from knowledge of another. 
Figure 1 illustrates differences between monist and pluralist accounts of scientific concepts, 
using ‘cause’ for illustration. Causation is what Otto Neurath called a Ballung concept, a concept 
with rough, porous boundaries, a congestion of different ideas and implications that in various 
combinations are brought into focus for different purposes and in different contexts (Cf. Cartwright 
et al. 1996, Cartwright and Bradburn 2011). Concepts like this can, and often do, play a central 
role in science, and especially in social science. But they cannot do so in their original form. To 
function properly in a scientific context they need to be made precise. 
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Figure 1. Causal Pluralism vs. Causal Monism. 
 
The right-hand side of figure 1 pictures a central, non-fuzzy core to this concept that can, 
possibly with great effort, be characterised precisely; ‘causes’ picks out some one relation; and the 
variety of methods employed in discovering causes are all methods for testing for that one relation. 
We establish this relation in a variety of ways but no matter how it is established, we can draw the 
same conclusions. 
Despite vast philosophical effort, we have not found any such central core that can properly 
be used in science, where rigor matters. The notions on offer and our theories about them are too 
thin; they do not allow us to draw many conclusions beyond what follows narrowly from the 
assumption that a given relation satisfies our definition. We don't have an empirically well-
supported web of inferences that attribution of the defined relation supports. 
The left-hand side of figure 1 fits better with what I see in scientific practice. ‘Cause’ has 
no precise ‘central core’. The trick in bringing it into a scientific context is not to find the ‘right’ 
characterization but rather to construct a characterization that does the jobs that we want to do 
when we use the term in that context. When it comes to testing causal claims, different methods 
are appropriate to different characterizations---and correlatively, for different characterizations, 
different inferences can be drawn from claims employing the concept ‘cause’. Characterizations 
will be done in different ways in different scientific disciplines, serving different ends and to fit 
with the different concepts, methods, assumptions, and standards operating in these disciplines. 
The more precise scientific concepts that result are then different from each other and different 
from the original Ballung concept.  
I sometimes use the ugly word ‘precisification’ to describe the process by which a Ballung 
concept is transformed into one fit for science. Sophia Efstathiou (2009) calls this process “found 
science” on the analogy of found art. Damien Hirst’s shark in formaldehyde is still a shark but it 
is not the same shark as when it was swimming in the sea. It has been made suitable for an artistic 
context, to serve specific artistic purposes. In Efstathiou’s words, the shark has been “founded”---
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given a form appropriate to serve its new purposes---in the artistic context. But the shark ‘founded’ 
as art loses most of its original functionings, including its ability to be founded in other contexts, 
such as shark soup.  
Similarly the different foundings of a Ballung concept like ‘cause’ or ‘race’ are not 
different ways of characterizing what remains the same concept. What can be shown true of ‘cause’ 
under one founding cannot be presumed true under another, and empirical methods that work for 
telling where one obtains do not normally secure a causal relation that has been founded in any 
other way. In particular they do not license inferences that follow given other foundings. 
The left-hand side of figure 1 pictures causal pluralism: different concepts differently 
founded for different purposes, all equally entitled to the name. Causal pluralism is not a 
philosopher’s game; it has real bite. We must not establish causal claims that have one 
interpretation, then use them as if they had a different one or we are headed for disaster. As both 
Popper and the Positivists insisted, where scientific claims are to be taken seriously, it matters 
exactly what those claims are.  
Consider evidence-based policy, where three different kinds of causal claims are regularly 
conflated: (a) Generic claims that hold locally: a cause-kind causes an effect-kind in some 
particular kind of situation (‘C causes E somewhere’); (b) generic claims that C causes E ‘widely’-
--across a range of situation types; (c) singular predictions that C will cause E in a specific new 
situation (‘C will cause E here’).1 Here is an example, not untypical but particularly striking 
because it mixes all three together, without note, in just one sentence, from a defense of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in development economics by Esther Duflo and Michael 
Kremer, the first an MIT economist, the second at Harvard, both at the Jamil Poverty Action Lab : 
‘‘The benefits of knowing which programs work … extend far beyond any program or agency, 
and credible impact evaluations … can offer reliable guidance to international organizations, 
governments, donors, and … NGO’s beyond national borders.” (Duflo and Kremer 2005, 205) 
‘Which programs work’ is about what works to produce the targeted effect widely; impact 
evaluations tell us that a program produced the effect somewhere; ‘reliable guidance’ predicts that 
the program will produce the effect in a new situation. This kind of conflation can lead to bad 
policy predictions and bad policy predictions can lead to bad development outcomes, completely 
contrary to the hopes of the authors. 
The worry is that policy will proceed by pun. A program is implemented somewhere and 
a careful after-the-fact evaluation is carried out to see if it achieved the intended results, say via an 
RCT. This can show that the program had a positive effect size there---e.g. a positive difference in 
the mean of the targeted effect in treatment and control groups---in the situation where it was tested. 
Add a handful of metaphysical and empirical assumptions, including that the situation of the 
treatment and control groups is governed by a set of the same linear causal laws, that there is a 
probability measure over the quantities in those causal laws for the combined treatment/control 
population, and that the study design ensures that the treatment and control groups differ only by 
values for the treatment variable and its downstream effects (or nearly enough so). Then a positive 
effect size shows that the treatment genuinely figures as a cause of the effect in a law governing 
that situation there (Cf. Cartwright and Hardie 2012). 
This provides evidence that the same cause figures in a law for a new situation only 
supposing that the new situation is governed by the same relevant causal law as the study situation. 
                                                
1 Of course these kinds of claim are themselves multiply ambiguous. 
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And it provides evidence that the effect size will be positive in a new situation only if2 in addition 
the interactive causal factors in that law have the same distribution in the target as in the study 
situation---an assumption that is often unlikely to be true. So a great deal of work needs to be done 
if the methods that establish ‘It works there’ are to be relevant to ‘It works here’, and you cannot 
avoid this work by just eliding the ‘here’ and ‘there’ and acting as if the claim established and the 
claim put to use are one and the same. 
Of course the problem is not restricted to concepts of causality but is endemic throughout 
the sciences. Nor am I alone in my concerns. William Wimsatt, for example, issues a similar 
warning against punning in science: “Applying a heuristic to a problem transforms the problem 
into a non-equivalent but intuitively related problem … But it is not the same problem, so beware: 
answers to the transformed problem may not be answers to the original problem.” (Wimsatt 2007, 
135) 
 
 
3. Some Foundings for ‘Causes’. 
 
 There are a variety of different accounts of causality prevalent in philosophy of science now. Each 
lays out important facts about how a system of relations must behave if the relations are to be 
labelled ‘causal’ under that particular precisification; each can be seen as a distinct way of 
founding more precisely the concept of causation. I shall focus on two: (1) a notion of causality 
suited to James Woodward's level invariance test, and (2) a notion characterized by the three basic 
axioms for causal Bayes nets (CBNs): (i) the causal Markov condition (CMC), (ii) faithfulness, 
and (iii) minimality.3 
(1) Woodward (2003) introduces level invariance in the context of what I call 
“epistemically convenient linear deterministic systems” (Cartwright 2007, 161) or ECLDSs. A 
linear deterministic system (LDS) is epistemically convenient if each effect in the system has at 
least one special cause that does not cause anything else in the system except by causing that effect, 
and the set of special causes is variation-free.4  
Suppose we take---as in (Cartwright 2007, 154) for instance---a set of familiar-looking 
axioms like irreflexivity and asymmetry that a scientific concept of causation might satisfy, plus 
the assumption that the causal laws of an ECLDS are responsible for any other true functional 
relations that obtain in it (i.e. that all ‘spurious’ relations derive from genuine causal laws) as an 
implicit definition---in Efstathiou's words, a ‘founding’---of a concept of causality that could 
obtain in an ECLDS. It is then provable that testing for Woodward’s level invariance is a reliable 
method for arriving at causes in the sense of ‘cause’ picked out by these axioms: an equation 
satisfies Woodward’s level invariance criterion if and only if it is a causally correct principle in 
this particular precisification of ‘cause’.5 
(2) Let me now turn to Causal Bayes nets. Here we find theorems that show the tight fit I 
                                                
2 Almost ‘only if’. Effect size is a function of the mean, which can of course be the same without the same distribution.  
3  Roughly CMC says that causal parents screen off effects from everything else except effects of the effect; 
Faithfulness, that causal parents and offspring are probabilistically dependent; minimality, that there are no more 
causal relations than necessary to account for the probabilistic dependencies and independencies described under CMC 
and Faithfulness (Cf. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000). 
4 That is, together they can take any combination of values from their separate ranges. 
5 The proof also provides a much needed characterization of what it means for an equation with a dummy variable 
representing ‘missing factors’---like the regression equations Woodward and others discuss that play a central role in 
social and economic sciences---to be causally correct. 
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advocate among characterization, methods, and use. Many of the CBN algorithms for discovering 
causal claims are provably valid so long as the three central CBN axioms are satisfied.6 That means 
we can take the axioms to characterize what is meant by ‘cause’ and be assured that the methods 
for finding out about causes are reliable for finding out about relations thus characterized as causal.  
 We also are assured that we have reliable ways to put that causal knowledge to use. There 
is, for instance, a well-known “manipulation theorem” in (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000, 
47) that describes what happens under a ‘manipulation’ of a given quantity to the probabilities of 
other quantities, assuming these are all governed by causal principles that satisfy the CBN axioms 
relative to the joint probability over the total set of quantities. But ‘manipulation’ is a very specific 
kind of change under very specific assumptions about the operative causal principles, including 
their stability as values of variables change. So warranting the claim that some particular set of 
actions we perform count as manipulations will be no easy matter and we must be careful not to 
be misled by casual use of the term ‘manipulation’.7  
 This tight fit of method and use to characterization has a downside, however. The methods 
are appropriate only for the concept of causality specified in the characterization, and similarly for 
the inferences we draw from causal claims, for instance about what will happen under 
manipulation. Wolfgang Spohn, I take it, would be happy with this. He is explicit in maintaining 
that causality is characterized by CBN axioms: “Bayesian nets are all there is to causal 
dependence”, he claims (Spohn 2001). But that does not seem to be how all advocates of the 
methods see it.  
Consider, for instance, a repeated conversation between Clark Glymour and me, which can 
help to make clear the points I have been urging and will bring the discussion back to the start. I 
worry about cases where the specified axioms fail. Glymour responds by showing all the wonderful 
ways that have been developed (and some that people have long been using) to cope in those cases 
to draw causal conclusions without relying on the axioms. But what then are we making claims 
about? How are we to understand what we mean when we claim ‘X causes Y’? Glymour seems 
uninterested in characterizations of ‘causes’ and so far as I know no characterization has been 
offered as such since the first work by Glymour, Scheines, and Spirtes (which seemed to adopt my 
view that generic causal claims are claims about what singular causal happenings would occur 
with what probability---inviting, of course, a characterization in turn for the concept of singular 
causation).8 
Perhaps though I am illicitly supposing causal pluralism. Perhaps all these different 
methods, the ones where the axioms hold and those that cope when some of the axioms fail, are--
-as on the right-hand side of figure 1---just different methods of finding out about a single causal 
relation, and in particular one for which the inferences we wish to make hold. In that case my 
worry about drawing inferences by pun is unfounded. But still the overall question looms. What 
guarantees that these methods are correct for establishing claims that support our inferences? No 
matter whether a term bears a monist or a pluralist interpretation, in science, where rigor matters, 
we need arguments to justify that the methods used for establishing claims support the conclusions 
drawn from them. There may be a kind of unity of method here: Our methods for testing claims 
                                                
6 Some are also valid for specific weakenings and others for specific strengthenings of the axioms. What I say in the 
text follows for those as well, assuming the characterization of ‘cause’ is adjusted accordingly. 
7 Glymour himself is careful about this. Cf. (Meek & Glymour 1994, 1010). 
8 This is also the view supposed in the Holland and Rubin defense of RCTs, which they take to provide the average 
individual effect size (Cf. Holland 1986). 
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with the word ‘cause’ in them may all be targeted at one and the same relation. But without a good 
characterization of what that relation is and how it behaves, we are not entitled to suppose that. 
This is a worry I have about over optimistic application of the nice work of Judea Pearl 
(2000). I worry about the comprehensiveness of his methods, not their validity. Pearl offers a 
complete methodology from hunting causes to using them. First he provides a general way to 
represent causal principles, maintaining that his representations are general enough to treat any 
kinds of causal principles we are familiar with. I don’t quarrel with this here. Second he offers a 
detailed semantics for inferring singular counterfactuals from causal principles of this form. Nor 
do I quarrel with this here. Third he points to reliable methods like CBNs and RCTs for inferring 
causal principles from probabilities. Though we probably disagree about how widely the 
assumptions hold that are necessary for these methods to be valid, I agree that the methods are 
powerful and can be reliable. The scheme is ideal. We have trustworthy methods for going from 
data to model and from model to prediction. So the predictions are well supported by the empirical 
evidence.  
The problem is in the join-up. We need reasons to suppose that the causal principles that 
produced the data in the studied situation are the same as those that produce the outcomes we want 
to predict in the target situation. But we seldom have such guarantees. The probabilistic methods 
that Pearl and others endorse for discovering causes can provide good descriptive accounts of the 
network of causal relations that obtain in various populations. These can be a part of the evidence 
base for the more basic science that allows us to predict what the causal principles might be in new 
situations.  
But simple induction, even if the models are for what is supposed to be the ‘same’ 
population, is seldom a good tool of inference---and to be warranted in using it, we need good 
reasons to believe we are studying an entrenched structure. Otherwise for new situations we need 
to predict new principles and we can’t do this by collecting statistics on populations in the not-yet-
existing situations. To predict laws for new situations we need theory and the large and tangled 
confluence of evidence and hypotheses that go into building up and supporting reliable theory. 
This is well beyond the network of statistics and background empirical and metaphysical 
assumptions that matter immediately to correct use of CBN methods or applications. 
 
 
4. Conclusion. 
 
Just what can we do when we know that X causes Y? As I have stressed, that depends on what 
‘causes’ means in this claim and that in turn is tightly tied to how the claim is established. So rather 
than focus on unity of method, I urge we devote more attention to comparisons among our methods 
and the various precissified concepts they measure. Sticking with the Ballung notion of cause for 
illustration, we need answers to: 
1. Which foundings of ‘cause’ are various familiar methods for causal inference good for 
discovering/testing? 
2. How good are they at these jobs, both in the ideal and in the kinds of conditions that obtain 
in practice? 
3. How good is the argument that vindicates each method? Are there deductive proofs as there 
are for some CBN algorithms? Do the arguments depend on empirical assumptions? If so, 
do we have a good, well-grounded sense of the kinds of situations in which those 
assumptions obtain? 
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4. What kinds of inferences follow given causal claims understood under various foundings? 
What kinds of strategies for achieving what we want are justified? 
5. How good are the arguments that show that these inferences are valid, with the same 
questions about empirical assumptions as in 3? 
6. What features of concrete situations or specific problem settings can help us recognize 
which foundings, which methods of causal discovery and which uses of causal knowledge 
are likely to be suited to them? 
This last is one of the big jobs facing us: getting concrete. Our characterizations are generally too 
abstract. For example, I have praised work in CBNs for its formal definitions and proofs. These 
guarantee we are not guessing about what methods are valid for discovering CBN causality, or for 
making further inferences from CBN-interpreted causal claims, or for when they are applicable. 
The explicit assumptions and definitions tell us when. But what do these conditions amount to in 
the real world? That is issue 6 in my desired catalogue of comparisons and it is of the utmost 
practical importance.  
I return at last to the general lesson my discussion of ‘causes’ is meant to elaborate. The 
topic for this symposium is unity of method. Perhaps, as some of the panelists urge, the methods 
it is appropriate to use for measuring and testing in the sciences can be unified in some way; 
perhaps we can find some core, some way in which they are all the same. That's fine so long as we 
do not lose focus on what makes them different, for it is the precise details of the differences that 
make them fit for the job of scientific testing: that ensure they mesh precisely with the kind of 
precisely characterized concepts that we employ in science to produce precise and reliable 
conclusions.  
Method must march hand-in-hand with the characterizations that our axioms and 
definitions lay out. There can be no more unity to the one than to the other. Philosophers still hold 
out hopes for a single sense of central concepts like ‘causes’, or perhaps for limiting the splintering 
to two or three senses---maybe, for ‘causes’, some version of a production account and some 
version of a difference-making account. I laud these attempts. It would be very helpful to have a 
single account, or at least a single core that all acceptable accounts have in common. Still, we want 
our sciences to produce exact, unambiguous, and precise claims. For these purposes a loose 
account of what we are talking about or a highly abstract characterization or a mere loose common 
core will not suffice. We will inevitably be using different foundings for different purposes. What 
matters is to ensure that the founding fits the purpose and that the methods we use for causal 
inference are good enough to warrant the conclusions we draw. Inference by pun is unwarranted 
inference. It is loose talk, and, as the World War II injunction warns: loose talk can kill. 
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